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SUMMARY
UGANDA: A ROLE MODEL FOR REFUGEE INTEGRATION?\ E. BOHNET & C. SCHMITZ-PRANGHE
Uganda hosts the largest refugee population in Africa and is, after Turkey and 
Pakistan, the third-largest refugee recipient country worldwide. Political and 
humanitarian actors have widely praised Ugandan refugee policies because of 
their progressive nature: In Uganda, in contrast to many other refugee-receiving 
countries, these are de jure allowed to work, to establish businesses, to access 
public services such as education, to move freely and have access to a plot of 
land. Moreover, Uganda is a pilot country of the Comprehensive Refugee  
Response Framework (CRRF). In this Working Paper the authors ascertain 
whether Uganda indeed can be taken as a role model for refugee integration, 
as largely portrayed in the media and the political discourse. They identify the 
challenges to livelihoods and integration to assess Uganda's self-reliance and 
settlement approach and its aspiration towards providing refugees and Ugandan 
communities receiving refugees with opportunities for becoming self-reliant. 
Drawing on three months of field research in northern and southern Uganda 
from July to September of 2017 with a particular focus on South Sudanese refu-
gees, the authors concentrate on three aspects: Access to land, employment 
and education, intra- and inter-group relations. The findings show that refu-
gees in Uganda are far from self-reliant and socially integrated. Although in 
Uganda refugees are provided with land, the quality and size of the allocated 
plots is so poor that they cannot earn a living from agricultural production, 
which thus, rather impedes self-reliance. Inadequate infrastructure also hin-
ders access to markets and employment opportunities. Even though most 
local communities have been welcoming to refugees, the sentiment has shifted 
recently in some areas, particularly where local communities that are often 
not better off than refugees feel that they have not benefitted from the pres-
ence of refugees.   
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opportunities remain scarce for all refugee groups as 
well as parts of the rural population in northern 
Uganda. The case of self-settled refugees in Arua town 
provides a different picture. Here, preexisting busi-
ness and family networks, remittances sent from 
South Sudan or countries of the Global North consid-
erably enable prospects for de facto local integration.
Shared displacement experiences,  
ethnic kinship between refugees and 
the local Ugandan population and  
direct benefits for the local Ugandan 
population facilitate social integration
The shared experience of displacement of Ugan-
dans and refugees, as well as ethnic and cultural ties 
between parts of the refugees and locals, contribute 
to empathy and solidarity between the two groups. 
Locals are especially welcoming towards refugees in 
areas in which they see the actual benefit of the aid 
distributed, such as new water holes or schools. On 
the other hand, historical grievances and conflict 
negatively affect the opportunities for social integra-
tion, a fact that has in some cases been ignored while 
setting up the refugee settlements. Moreover, resent-
ment has grown as of late due to the increasing num-
ber of refugees.
Land for agriculture is not sufficient for 
sustaining a living, and not all refugees 
are farmers
Uganda's settlement approach foresees that each 
arriving refugee receives a plot of land to become 
self-reliant. However, the poor quality and size of the 
allocated plots means that they cannot earn a living 
from agricultural production. Especially in Rhino 
Camp, Bidi Bidi and Nakivale refugee settlements, the 
soil is reportedly infertile, and refugee and Ugandan 
communities struggle with water shortage and hun-
ger. Furthermore, many refugees are not accustomed 
to farming and have difficulty in adapting to the dif-
ferent lifestyle.
Forced immobility and inequal access 
to resources create social tensions 
Sizes of plots and distributed food rations differ ac-
cording to region and time of the refugees’ arrival. This 
creates resentment among refugee groups because 
some feel at a disadvantage compared with others. In 
cases where family members arrive later and receive a 
plot in a different refugee settlement, families often 
decide to stay together and share a plot and food ra-
tions . Forced immobility resulting from the fact that 
aid provision is limited to the settlements and the 
costs for transportation are high constrain the liveli-
hood options of refugees.
Local communities are not necessarily 
better off than refugees
Uganda's West Nile region has been historically 
marginalised. In particular, infrastructure has re-
mained poor. Thus especially in the northern regions, 
large parts of the local Ugandan population are not 
better off than refugees are. International food distri-
butions enable some refugees to hire locals to work 
for them, e.g. constructing their houses, digging out 
latrines. Yet, their situation remains poor and is far 
from reaching self-sufficiency. Diversified and long-
term jobs, training and secondary education 
Main findings
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self-reliance of refugees. 2 The CRRF was one of the 
outcomes of the New York Declaration on Refugees 
that was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 
19 September 2016. Uganda is a pilot country of the 
CRRF (UNHCR, 2017) and considered to be a role model 
for other countries (by political actors). 
However, can Uganda indeed be taken as a role 
model for refugee integration, as largely portrayed in 
the media and the political discourse when looking 
at the envisaged launch of the Global Compact on 
Refugees, one of the outcomes of the CRRF? The  
authors will address this question by investigating 
the challenges to local integration and self-reliance 
of refugees in Uganda. How do refugees in Uganda 
cope with the challenges of displacement and how  
do they regard their situation? The focus lies on the 
perspectives of the refugees and their receiving popu-
lations, also considering the point of view of local and 
international aid agencies to understand how self- 
reliance strategies have so far been employed and 
what challenges remain. 3
The centre of attention of this Paper is not de jure 
integration, understood as the successive granting of 
rights and opportunities by the government culmi-
nating in the granting of citizenship rights in the  
receiving country. Instead, we focus on de facto inte-
gration defined by Jacobsen as a condition where 
"refugees are not in physical danger, are able to sus-
tain livelihoods through access to land or employment, 
and can support themselves and their families, have 
access to education and vocational training" (2001,  
p. 9). De facto local integration of displaced persons is 
a gradual process and manifests itself in livelihood 
strategies resulting in better chances for participation 
in society while self-reliance, as defined by UNHCR 
2 \  Building on the existing Ugandan policy approaches, the CRRF in 
Uganda officially addresses five mutually-reinforcing areas: Admission 
and rights; emergency response and ongoing needs; resilience and 
self-reliance of refugees; expansion of third country solutions and 
complementary pathways (such as scholarships and student visas), 
and finally voluntary repatriation, which in the current situation 
focuses on investment in human capital and transferrable skills as 
well as support to the countries of origin.
3 \  In February 2017, the glorious picture of refugee integration in  
Uganda was briefly damaged when Ugandan aid officials were accused 
of fraud; inflating refugee numbers and misusing aid money. As a con-
sequence, a biometric verification system was introduced (Guardian, 
2018; Angenendt & Biehler, 2018).
Uganda hosts the largest refugee population in 
Africa and is, after Turkey and Pakistan, the third- 
largest recipient country of refugees worldwide with 
almost 1.1 million refugees, mostly South Sudanese 
(UNHCR, 2018m). South Sudanese also represent the 
largest group of newly displaced refugees in the 
world.
Political and humanitarian actors have widely 
praised Ugandan refugee policies because of their 
progressive nature: In Uganda, in contrast to many 
other countries that host refugees, these are de jure 
allowed to work, to establish businesses, to access 
public services such as education, to move freely and 
have access to a plot of land (Refugee Act, 2006; Krause, 
2016). The majority of refugees live in one of the desig-
nated refugee settlements (in the official political dis-
course, these are understood as long-term structures 
as opposed to refugee camps) which are intended to 
provide refugees with a degree of self-sufficiency. As 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) Filippo Grandi stated at the beginning  
of 2018: “Uganda has the most progressive refugee 
policies in Africa, if not the world”.
In 1999, the Self-Reliance Strategy was introduced 
in Uganda which sought to integrate services provided 
to refugees into existing public service structures and 
make refugee settlements self-reliant by allocating 
land to refugees and allowing them free access to 
government health and education services (Hovil, 
2018, p. 5). Since 2016, Uganda has implemented the 
Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) 
strategy which aims at harmonising the refugee  
response in Uganda by integrating refugee program-
ming into the national development plan.1 ReHoPE  
is a key component of the Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Framework (CRRF) in Uganda, a multi- 
stakeholder approach with the objective of easing 
pressure on host countries and enhancing 
1 \  ReHoPE is based on the Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) which was jointly 
designed by the Office of the Prime Minister and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Uganda in 1999. It was 
conceptualised specifically for then Sudanese refugees living in West 
Nile recognizing the long-term nature of their situation. Its overarching 
goal was to “integrate the services provided to the refugees into regular 
government structures and policies” and in doing so “moving from 
relief to development”.
Introduction
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Our empirical insights presented below comple-
ment earlier research on refugee livelihoods in Uganda 
(e.g. Hovil, 2007; Betts et al, 2016; Monteith & Lwasa, 
2017; Kaiser, 2006, 2010) with our strong focus on the 
receiving communities and intergroup relations. 
The Paper is based on field research which was 
conducted from July to September 2017 in Uganda 
within the framework of the project “Protected rather 
than protracted: Strengthening refugees and peace” 
which was funded by the German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). 
Though the focus of this Paper lies on South Sudanese 
refugees in the northern part of Uganda, we also include 
some data we gathered on Burundian and Congolese 
refugees in the south of the country to complement 
the picture and identify similarities and differences 
of refugee livelihoods in the respective areas.
While most refugees in Uganda are from South 
Sudan, Uganda has recently also witnessed a new 
vast influx of people from the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC) and hosts a large number of mostly 
Burundians who find themselves in protracted dis-
placement in the south of the country. The Paper deals 
with these three largest refugee groups in Uganda but 
pays particular attention to the first. Differences of their 
situations, as well as common challenges that they 
face, will be analysed and compared. In addition, and 
especially with regard to intergroup relations and 
their impact on the prospects of self-reliance and local 
integration, the authors also scrutinise socio-economic 
differences between settlement-based and urban  
refugees in the north of Uganda. While most refugees 
in Uganda live in designated refugee settlements, as 
of March 2018, seven per cent of the total number of 
refugees in Uganda have been categorised as urban 
refugees (UNHCR, 2018e). 
In the Paper, the authors first provide a brief back-
ground and overview of the regional displacement 
dynamics before presenting the methodology of how 
they analysed the situation of refugees in Uganda re-
garding self-reliance and local integration. In a next 
step, they present their field research findings focus-
ing on three main aspects: Access to land, employment 
and intergroup relations. They conclude their analysis 
with a description of the challenges and limitations 
of the current refugee policies in Uganda.
(2006), is "the social and economic ability of an individual 
[…] to meet essential needs, such as […] food, water, 
personal safety […] and education, in a sustainable 
manner" (p. 1). As the definition of self-reliance con-
tains the goals of achieving sustainable livelihoods 
and accessing education and safety, we assume here 
that self-reliance is an integral part of the process of 
local integration. However, de facto integration goes 
beyond self-reliance and includes as well that refu-
gees are socially networked into the host community" 
(Jacobsen, 2001, p. 9). At the same time, the authors  
argue that self-reliance without the socio-economic 
integration of the individual is hardly achievable.
Thus, in this Paper, we will analyse not only struc-
tural factors shaping the opportunities for self-reliance 
and de facto local integration but also power relations 
between refugee communities and local Ugandan 
communities. This approach corresponds to claims 
in livelihood studies that power needs to be included 
as “an important explanatory variable” in our under-
standing of livelihoods 4 (De Haan & Zoomers, 2005 in 
Geiser, 2016, p.44). Three criteria must be taken into 
account: structural factors such as access to rights 
and resources; individual factors such as skills; and 
intergroup relations as all three considerably shape 
livelihoods of displaced persons and members of the 
receiving communities and consequently also their 
prospects of achieving self-reliance. 
The Paper thus focuses on access to land, employ-
ment and education, as well as on intra- and intergroup 
relations to identify the challenges to livelihoods and 
integration to assess Uganda’s self-reliance and settle-
ment approach against its aspiration to provide  
opportunities for self-reliance of refugees and refugee- 
receiving Ugandan communities. 5
4 \  Livelihoods are defined as “the capabilities, assets (stores, resources, 
claims and access) and activities required for a means of living: a live-
lihood is sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and 
shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, and provide 
sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and 
which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and 
global levels and in the short and long term” (Chambers & Conway, 
1991).
5 \  Cernea (2000) in his Impoverishment, Risk and Reconstruction (IRR) 
Model has also identified these factors among others as the main com-
ponents to reduce the risk of impoverishment.
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armed fractions splintered and the number of oppo-
sition groups increased. In five years of war, it has  
become difficult to distinguish clear conflict trends 
(Beaumont, 2018). On 27 June 2018, a new peace agree-
ment was signed in Khartoum by Kiir and Machar 
and included more representatives of different oppo-
sition groups than before. However, the agreed impu-
nity of the atrocities committed by all actors involved 
in the conflict and the diverse geopolitical interests 
of the neighbouring countries question its viability. 
Uganda is considered a supporter of Kiir, whereas  
Sudan supports Machar (New York Times, 2018, Tanza, 
2018), reflecting old-established alliances from the 
civil war between Sudan and then Southern Sudan 
(1983–2005). Indeed, the ceasefire foreseen in the 
peace agreement was violated hours after its declara-
tion (Reuters, 2018c). A professor at Columbia University 
and director of the Institute of Social Research at 
Makerere University in Kampala (Uganda) states: 
"The future of South Sudan is likely to be marred by 
continuing chaos until a single dominant group 
emerges out of it […] and regional powers will likely 
be further drawn into the conflict" (New York Times, 
Uganda is characterised by a long history of dis-
placement with people from neighbouring countries, 
such as South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) and Burundi moving back and forth and 
has also experienced large-scale internal and 
cross-border displacement. 6 By November 2018, more 
than 1.1 million refugees lived in Uganda (UNHCR, 
2018m). Around 71 per cent of all refugees in Uganda 
were from South Sudan. 7 
Refugees from South Sudan 
Most of the refugees from South Sudan are settled 
in the borderlands to South Sudan in Yumbe (286,859), 
Arua (270,390), Adjumani (257,104) and Moyo (151,304) 
in north-western Uganda (UNHCR, 2018a). After 22 
years of civil war between the Sudan People’s Libera-
tion Army/Movement (SPLA/M) and the successive 
governments of Sudan, South Sudan gained inde-
pendence in 2011. In 2013, a new war broke out in 
South Sudan. Since then, several attempts to reach a 
peace agreement between the rivalling South Sudanese 
opponents, President Salva Kiir and former Vice  
President Riek Machar, have failed. After the peace 
agreement (Agreement on the Resolution of the  
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan—ARCISS) of 
August 2015, fighting between the forces of Machar 
and the army erupted again in July 2016. Machar fled 
to the DRC and was later detained in South Africa (e.g. 
Dessu, 2018; Maasho, 2018). Further peace talks only 
led to unstable and short phases of a cease-fire, while 
6 \  By the beginning of the 1980s, after the Tanzanian army had invaded 
Uganda and overthrew the regime of Idi Amin, large parts of the popu-
lation of West Nile fled across the borders to avoid persecution by 
Ugandan forces. In the 1990s, rebel groups sponsored by Sudan such as 
the Lord´s Resistance Army (LRA) and the West Nile Bank Front caused 
instability and further displacements (Leopold, 2009, p. 472). It is  
estimated that at that time, some 90 per cent of the population of 
northern Uganda were uprooted as a result of conflict between the 
LRA and the government. Considerable additional displacement has 
been caused by armed cattle raiders from the north-eastern Karamoja 
region (Miller, 2007).
7 \  Refugees from different countries of origin and different ethno-linguistic 
groups show certain settlement patterns and preferences to settle in 
certain destination countries or areas within those countries. The  
regional approach of our research project “Protected rather than  
protracted” allowed us to identify factors that affect these settlement 
patterns. These are, among others, the geographic distance, preexisting 
(family) networks, ethno-linguistic factors, socio-economic factors, a 
deteriorated security situation and perceived livelihood perspectives.
Regional displacement dynamics
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2018). Displacement of South Sudanese to Uganda will 
most likely not end soon, but be there for years to 
come. Consequently, finding long-lasting integration 
measures for refugees in Uganda is vital.
Old and new arrivals
The South Sudanese refugee situation in Uganda 
is neither static nor linear. Because of oscillating con-
flict intensity and (short) periods of ceasefires, South 
Sudanese refugee movements are characterised by 
“back and forth movements” that started during the 
civil war in the 1980s and are ongoing. Most South 
Sudanese refugees and those internally displaced 
within the country have been displaced more than 
once. 
Some of them have not returned to South Sudan, 
even after the comparatively longer period of less 
fighting after South Sudan’s declaration of independ-
ence in 2011. For some young South Sudanese, the 
chance of receiving a better education in Uganda 
played a role in their decision to stay there while 
their parents often returned to South Sudan. Besides 
education, scepticism concerning the peace processes 
were other reasons to stay. Some interviewed refugees 
have already lived in Uganda for several years or  
decades. The Ugandan government as well as interna-
tional and local aid providers define South Sudanese 
refugees by their time of arrival in Uganda and there-
fore speak of ´old and new caseloads´. Usually, ´old 
caseloads´ refer to those who came before 2016 and 
´new caseloads´ to those who came in 2016, 2017 and 2018.
While the term ´caseload´ in itself can be seen 
critically because it implies ´a burden´, the differenti-
ation between the ´old´ and ´new´ ones is important 
to note, as the time of arrival is one of the decisive 
factors for the location of the designated settlement 
of refugees, the size of land allocated to the refugee 
and the food ration provided. 8
As fighting in South Sudan shifted to different  
regions, and more and more new groups were in-
volved in the conflict, the ethnic composition of refu-
gees from South Sudan in Uganda changed over time. 
8 \  For the effects on social relations and opportunities for self-reliance, 
see section on land access.
In the beginning, mainly Dinka and Nuer, the two 
largest ethnic groups in South Sudan, were displaced 
from their homes in Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei 
States. But as the conflict spilt over to the south and 
Eastern and Central Equatoria from July 2016 onwards, 
more and more people fled from these regions, mainly 
Kuku, Kakwa, Pojulu, Acholi and Madi, but also many 
others. 9
Thus, the ethnic composition of refugees in 
Uganda is as diverse as the population of South Su-
dan. In Boroli settlement in Adjumani district in the 
north of Uganda, for example, 30 different ethnic 
groups from South Sudan are registered. However, not 
all refugee settlements are that ethnically diverse 
and not all are mixed. In Moyo, for example, mainly 
Nuer and Equatorians have settled. In Odubu I, it is 
mainly Dinka, and in Bidi Bidi most refugees come 
from the Equatoria region (interviews with Office of 
the Prime Minister  - OPM and UNHCR, July 2017). 
Refugees from the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (DRC)
The second-largest group of refugees in Uganda 
are those from the DRC with a total of 316,968 by the 
end of July 2018. Refugees from the DRC came to 
Uganda in 1999 due to the Second Congolese War. In 
2010, Uganda signed a Tripartite Agreement with the 
DRC and the UNHCR that intended to assist return 
movements, but due to the protracted instability in 
the east of their home country, refugees were hesitant 
to return (UNHCR & ATCR, 2014). As violence in Ituri 
and North Kivu provinces of the DRC escalated in De-
cember 2017, new Congolese refugees came to western 
Uganda mainly. By 13 February 2018, it was estimated 
that about 34,000 people had crossed the border from 
the DRC to Uganda in 2018 (Start Network & acaps, 
2018). Most Concolese refugees (78,084) live in Rwam-
wanja (UNHCR, 2018f).
9 \  Western Equatorians are a minority group among the Equatorians in 
refuge in Uganda, with geography playing a significant role for their 
trajectory of displacement. Western Equatoria is closer to the DRC and 
Central African Republic (CAR). Thus, despite the glorification of 
Uganda´s refugee policy, many Western Equatorians found it difficult 
to access Uganda (information provided by South Sudanese male, Kakwa, 
Arua, November 2018).
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Refugees from Burundi
The third-largest group of refugees in Uganda is 
from Burundi; they have been in the country for the 
longest. Recently, however, new movements to Uganda 
have been observed. There are currently 40,765 Burun-
dian refugees, located mainly in the south of Uganda. 
Most of them are in the administrative district of 
Isingiro with 32,632 and 7,814 in Kampala and 2,121 in 
Kyegegwa. Many of the Burundian refugees first came 
in the early 1990s when the fighting between the  
Burundian government and Hutu rebel groups started 
(NRC, 2005; UNHCR, 2018a). Although the civil war  
officially ended in 2005, the ceasefire between the 
government and the only remaining active rebel 
group (National Liberation Forces (FNL)) failed in 
2007 (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2008; UNHCR, 
2018a). This failure induced a new refugee movement 
to Uganda in 2007. As the peace agreement was not 
implemented, the movement continued so that by 
2014, 11,903 Burundians had fled to Uganda. As the 
Burundian President Pierre Nkurunzizab announced 
his highly debated move to seek a third term in office, 
political conflicts arose in Burundi from April 2015 on. 
Until November 2015, about 200 people were killed. 
Political repression and human rights abuses such as 
arbitrary arrests or extrajudicial killings increased 
the fear of a renewed civil war (Al Jazeera, 2015). The 
Imbonerakure, a youth organisation affiliated with 
Nkurunzizab, the National Intelligence Services and 
security forces are considered to be responsible for 
those atrocities. These three forces closely cooperate 
with each other as well as with the government. Fur-
thermore, the Imbonerakure even took de facto state 
control in some areas (Canada: Federal Court of Appeal, 
2018). These developments induced renewed refugee 
movements to Uganda so that in 2017, 38,245 Burundian 
refugees were recorded (Bentley, Oyuke, Penar & 
Sebudandi, 2016; UNHCR, 2018a). 
While some Burundian refugees had first fled  
to Tanzania, they moved to Uganda later on because  
the Tanzanian government had started to take on 
more restrictive measures against refugees, such as 
restricting their movements (Chiasson, 2015) and 
forcing them to repatriate to Burundi and closing 
camps. Burundian refugees interviewed in Uganda 
who have tried to return to Burundi stated that they 
were not welcome there. They were no longer consid-
ered to be "Burundians" after their year-long stays in 
Tanzania (interviews with Burundians, Oruchinga, Au-
gust 2017). 
To sum up, the region is facings various and inter-
mingling displacement dynamics that combine dec-
ade-long situations of protracted displacements with 
newer flows of displaced persons. The effects of Ugan-
da’s refugee policy on the conditions under which ref-
ugees try to secure their livelihoods and to socially in-
tegrate into the Ugandan society, however, differ 
considerably as will be outlined in the Chapter on 
intergroup relations (p. xxx ff).
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To analyse the situation of these three refugee 
groups, particularly the first one, we conducted three 
months of field research from July to September 2017 
in Uganda. Our South Sudanese research assistant 
John Kenyi collected and contributed additional lon-
gitudinal data covering the period from summer 2017 
until early summer 2018. The following map shows 
the research locations covered in this study. 
South Sudan and Community Technology Empower-
ment Network (South Sudanese NGOs), Danish Refugee 
Council, GIZ, International Rescue Committee, Jesuit 
Refugee Services, KfW, Lutheran World Federation, 
Malteser International, Mercy Corps, Norwegian  
Refugee Council, Nsamizi (Ugandan), Oxfam, Red 
Cross, Samaritan Purse, UNRSPO, War Child Nether-
lands and Canada, Welthungerhilfe (WHH) and Win-
dle Trust. We also spoke with scholars from Makerere 
University. The 100 interviews with refugees and 
members of the local Ugandan communities were 
carried out with the help of several assistants and 
translators to be able to speak to members of different 
ethno-linguistic groups, including Acholi, Aringa, 
Dinka, Kakwa, Kuku, Lugbara, Nuer, Madi, Murle and 
Mundu. We were not able to select the interviewees at 
random because in many cases either village leaders 
in the refugee settings (Refugee Welfare Councils)  
or aid organisations did a pre-selection of potential 
interview-partners. Nevertheless, we tried to diversify 
the interviewees as much as possible with regard to 
age, religion, ethnic belonging, gender and socio-eco-
nomic situation, rural and urban settlement, and, at 
the same time, we took into account what kind of 
groups are most presented within each village. We 
also interviewed representatives from youth and 
women’s groups. 
With the overall focus of the Paper on the micro/ 
individual and group levels, we mainly focussed on 
refugee settlements and local Ugandan communities 
in rural areas but also included the cities of Arua and 
Kampala to be able to compare the situation of urban 
and rural refugees. In Arua, we conducted 26 inter-
views, in Kampala 20. However, in Kampala, for feasi-
bility reasons, we were only able to interview young 
students—which, however, is also one of the main 
refugee groups within the city. 10 The interviews have 
been complemented with on-the-spot observations 
and information that has been triangulated by our 
research assistants (one South Sudanese and one 
Ugandan), expert interviews as well as academic and 
grey literature. 
10 \  The results of Kampala have not been considered in this Paper because 
the situation for students in Kampala are quite different to the other 
refugee groups in the country. 
Methodology
Map 2  
Field research locations in Uganda
LAKE 
VICTORIA
UGANDA
Pagrinya
Ayilo II
Rhino¹
Bidi Bidi²
Boroli
Palorinya
Maaji³
Pakelle
Kampala
Nakivale
Oruchinga
Kyaja II
Yumbe
Arua
KENYA
DR CONGO
RWANDA TANZANIA
SOUTH SUDAN
ISINGIRO
KYEGEGWA
ARUA
YUMBE MOYO
ADJUMANI
SUDAN
SOUTH
SUDAN
DR
CONGO TANZANIA
KENYA
ETHIOPIA
UGANDA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
visited town / city
visited district
¹ Eden 6, Ocea A+B, Odobu, Tika
³ Maaji I-III
² Zone 1 + 2
visited refugee 
settlement
Sources: Natural Earth Data 2018  Map Layout: Hannes Blitza, Sept. 2018
We used a qualitative approach to capture the 
perspectives of refugees and Ugandan receiving com-
munities on their livelihood situation. In total, we 
undertook 100 semi-structured in-depth interviews 
and 15 group interviews or focus group discussions 
with both refugees and Ugandans. We conducted an 
additional 40 interviews with experts and key in-
formants of the Office of the Prime Minister, district 
and sub-county representatives, international organ-
isations, such as the UNHCR and World Food Pro-
gramme, as well as international and local non-gov-
ernmental organisations (NGOs), such as American 
Refugee Committee, Center for Democracy Initiative 
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To be able to identify the challenges of integra-
tion and self-reliance, we used both a deductive and 
inductive approach. First, we drew on the Impover-
ishment, Risk and Reconstruction Model of Michael 
Cernea (2000) to analyse the situation of refugees and 
Ugandan communities. Cernea’s model delineates 
the risks that come with displacement (causes of im-
poverishment) and offers indicators for measuring 
impoverishment and challenges of integration. This 
study mainly focuses on three of Cernea´s indicators 
which we consider—based on our data—especially 
relevant as preconditions for self-reliance and de facto 
local integration in the Ugandan case. These factors 
are also prominent in the definitions of self-reliance 
and local integration we used (see Introduction):
1\ Landlessness and food insecurity vs. access to 
land, food and water;
2\ Joblessness vs. access to employment, training 
and business opportunities;
3\ Marginalisation and social disarticulation vs.  
social integration.
We also included the indicators protection risks, 
the ability to move freely and central-peripheral rela-
tions, as these factors also proved relevant for the ac-
cess to livelihood options. We developed the latter in-
dicators based on our field research findings, thus, 
taking both a deductive and inductive approach to 
analysing facilitators for and obstacles to integration 
and self-reliance.
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In this chapter, we will analyse the factors that 
influence the prospects for social integration and 
self-reliance of refugees, especially from South Sudan. 
It also includes a short overview of the situation of 
refugees from Burundi and the DRC, outlining the 
limitations and challenges of Uganda's settlement 
approach for all three-refugee groups. It analyses the 
situation of refugees regarding their access to land, 
food and water, as well as to employment, training 
and business opportunities.
Access to Land:  
Uganda's settlement approach
Since 1959, Uganda has been hosting refugees in 
village-style settlements. In northern Uganda, the lo-
cal settlement programme for (then) Sudanese refu-
gees started in 1992.
Uganda’s settlement approach foresees that refu-
gees are given a plot of land under the premise that 
this enables self-reliance in the medium- and long 
run. It is primarily this approach that has brought 
Uganda its reputation of a liberal and generous  
refugee policy. Refugee settlements are understood as 
long-term structures that offer the possibility for a 
degree of self-sufficiency as opposed to camps (Zakaryan, 
2018). Our results demonstrate that while the settle-
ment policy can be a major facilitator for social inte-
gration and sufficient land may foster self-reliance, at 
the same time, land access may cause tensions be-
tween refugees and Ugandans (see Chapter on inter-
group relations).
The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) negoti-
ates the provision of land for the allocation of refugee 
settlements with the district governments. Negotia-
tions ideally lead to a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) (see p.27). This process is often lengthy and 
complex and also depends on different types of land 
tenure systems in Uganda (cf. Zarayan, 2018, p. 6). 
Usually, negotiations with the communities are 
based on the commitment of OPM and UNHCR to 
install infrastructure such as health centres and 
schools in the affected districts which would benefit 
Ugandan receiving communities. So far, there is an 
agreement that 30 per cent of international refugee 
assistance should directly target receiving communi-
ties. However, this agreement is contested, and dis-
tricts are increasingly pushing for a 50/50 ratio.
The willingness of the local population to provide 
land for a refugee settlement differs depending on 
the general availability of land. For instance, the area 
where Rhino Camp refugee settlement is located is 
comparatively sparsely populated. Reportedly, the  
locals have so much land that they are not able to 
cultivate it all by themselves (interview with WHH 
worker, Rhino Camp refugee settlement, Eden, July 
2017). “The agreement between UNHCR and hosts 
worked out: The hosts accepted that the refugees set-
tle here, in exchange for schools and health centres” 
(interview with a South Sudanese founder and repre-
sentative of an NGO, Arua, July 2017). In other areas, 
the negotiations with the landowners seem to be 
more difficult. Some community landowners in Olua 
I/II in Adjumani District, have reportedly reclaimed 
land that was previously rented to groups of refugee 
farmers and there are reports of local youth blocking 
aid delivery to refugee settlements (UNHCR, 2018h). 
Thus, the Ugandan settlement approach faces consid-
erable challenges in several regions, especially with 
regard to the communities’ consent to the allocation 
of land for refugee settlements.
The norm has been to provide 30x30 m2 residen-
tial land and 50x50 m2 for agriculture purposes to a 
household. However, some refugees, especially the 
new arrivals, have only been given a residential plot. 
Others were given an agriculture plot that was too far 
away from their residential plot. Some refugees re-
ceived 25x25 m2 and some only 13x20 m2, which also 
created a sense of inequality between different refu-
gee groups. When new family members arrive, they 
often want to settle with other family members who 
arrived earlier, yet there is no space for them on the 
same spot of land. Thus, interviewees in Rhino Camp 
refugee settlement, for example, mentioned that they 
would settle next to the family and try to rent their 
other plot to someone else.
Field research findings: 
Parameters of de facto local integration
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ing cattle were another cause of crop failure:  
“The cattle don’t stay in the agreed zones, but destroy 
everything” (focus group discussion with Dinka com-
munity, Odobu I, Rhino camp refugee settlement, July 
2017). 
Refugees not only complain about the inadequately 
small size and poor soil quality of the plots but also 
about their location as access to services such as edu-
cation and health services is difficult. 11 The distance 
to health facilities and schools, however, is also a  
problem for local Ugandans.
The plots’ sizes differ in each settlement, and 
plots are often reduced to accommodate newly arriving 
refugees. Urban refugees, such as in Kampala and Arua, 
are not considered at all by the settlement approach.
The fact of having been granted a plot of land to 
settle on does not necessarily guarantee access to land 
for food production. As of March 2017, only 55.1 per 
cent of all refugees had land that was suitable for 
household food production (OPM/UNHCR Inter-Agency 
Presentation, Food Security and Nutrition Assessment, 
Kampala, Uganda, 10 March 2017, in Zarkayan 2018, p. 4). 
A Congolese, 22-year-old female refugee in Nakivali 
also reports that "there is no land to cultivate" (inter-
view, Nakivali, August 2017).
Another factor that impedes cultivation is per-
ceived insecurity. In various interviews, Dinka refu-
gees, in particular, mentioned that they would hardly 
leave their residential area as they feared harassment 
and violence by fellow (non-Dinka) refugees. Other 
groups of refugees behave the same as they fear mem-
bers of the Ugandan local communities. In Bidi Bidi, 
for instance, women reported: 
We received our plots of land to dig on it, but we haven’t 
started digging yet. We fear the nationals. They don’t 
want refugees on their land. We would dare to go 
there in a group for digging, but never by ourselves  
(focus group discussion at women’s centre, Bidi Bidi, 
Zone 3, village 1). 
11 \  Reportedly, refugees tried to actively obtain plots of land from local land 
owners in the refugee settlements they desperately wanted to be in—with 
an established population and better services, such as health and educa-
tion facilities, rather than being taken to peripheral remote bushes. 
Some new arrivals for example opted to remain around Ocea reception 
centre, as there was a school, a health center and a small market (in-
formation provided by a South Sudanese refugee, Arua, November 2018).
Practices of getting land
Besides using the officially designated and dis-
tributed plots, refugees themselves negotiate with 
the local population to lease land for cultivation. In 
some cases, the owners ask for a seasonal rent; in 
other cases and areas, local landowners leave land to 
the refugees for free or receive a share of the harvest. 
Many refugees who cultivate food on someone else’s 
land reported that they would sometimes share some 
fruits or vegetables with the landowner (group inter-
view with WHH farmer field group, Rhino Camp 
refugee settlement, Eden, July 2017). Some refugees 
‘bought’ land from Ugandan landowners, though local 
landowners are legally not allowed to sell land titles, 
but would give land to the refugees “for the sake of 
development.” The land allocated to the refugees often 
is bushland which needs to be cleared before cultivation 
can begin. Accordingly, the landowner also might  
expect to profit in the future, once the refugees return 
to their country of origin (interview with Mundu 
Leader, Arua, July 2017). 
Another strategy of obtaining more land is culti-
vating empty plots or land that has been abandoned 
by other refugees, because they returned to their 
countries of origin, relocated to unite with their fam-
ilies in other settlements (often without receiving a 
new plot there) or settled in town but still stay regis-
tered as refugees to receive rations. 
Constraints to cultivation: Small plots, poor soil and 
seeds, insecurity and lack of skills
Our research reveals that the aspiration of the  
settlement policy to enable self-sufficiency of refugees 
has not been met as neither the size nor the quality of 
the allocated plots allow for meaningful agricultural 
production. In Rhino Camp and Nakivale refugee set-
tlements, the soil is reportedly infertile, and the local 
population struggles with water shortage. Refugees 
complain that the quality of the seeds provided by aid 
agencies to grow okra, maize, cassava or tomatoes was 
poor. 
Drought has been a problem in the southern region 
of the country. Besides poor soil quality and drought 
in some areas, insects also affected the harvest. Roam-
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Kityaza village, near Nakivali, also explains that 
drought is a problem which prevents them from 
growing enough food.
In the north, aid agencies are drilling boreholes 
ever deeper into the ground (e.g. up to 100m in Rhino 
Camp refugee settlement), but still, parts of the popu-
lation cannot access them as they are too far away. 
UNHCR reports of poor quality groundwater and the 
ensuing need for the construction of piped water net-
works in Rhino Camp and other settlements, such as 
in the south. Until the construction is finished, the 
settlement is dependent on water trucking. Reportedly, 
the quality of trucked water is also poor (UNHCR, 
2018k). In Rhino Camp, 53 per cent of water needs are 
met through water trucking compared to 21 per cent 
in Bidi Bidi (UNHCR, 2018l). Although in the Adjumani 
region, there are fewer water shortages, the amount 
of water per person per day needed still exceeds the 
8.9 litres that are provided by 11.1 litres) (UNHCR, 
2018h). In some areas, refugees are better supplied 
with water than Ugandan communities. 12
Hence, improved access to water as a consequence 
of the newly drilled boreholes and the agreement  
between aid agencies and OPM that for every two 
boreholes drilled for the refugee population, one is 
drilled for a Ugandan community, is a very tangible 
benefit of the refugees’ presence for many Ugandans 
in the West Nile region. Ansela, a 28-year-old Ugandan 
woman in Tika, Rhino Camp (refugee) settlement,  
recounts: 
Here, most refugees arrived 15 years ago. Before the 
new refugees [in 2016] arrived, we had to walk four 
kilometres to fetch water. Now, it is very close. But 
still, our main problems are the poor road conditions, 
and that we do not have enough manpower to dig the 
land (interview with female Ugandan, Tika, Rhino 
Camp refugee settlement, July 2017). 
But still, long queues at the water points lead to 
heightened tensions among the refugees and 
12 \  A survey by REACH among refugee and local Ugandan households in 
Moyo finds that 54 per cent of refugee households and 57 per cent of 
receiving community households reported not having enough water 
to cover their basic needs. In Moyo, 27 per cent of the interviewed 
Ugandans reported distance as the main challenge to collecting water. 
Among the interviewed refugees, only 13 per cent of refugees menti-
oned this (UNHCR, Multi-sector Needs Assessment: Moyo District, 
Uganda, August, 2018).
Finally, the settlement approach is challenged by 
the fact that it is based on the assumption that all 
refugees wish and know how to cultivate the land. 
Many of the settlement-based refugees, however, do 
not bring agricultural expertise but had been work-
ing in other sectors of the South Sudanese economy. 
Also in the south, many refugees from Burundi and 
the DRC state that they are not used to cultivating 
land. A 58-year-old refugee man in Juru, Nakivali, also 
expresses that "children do not want to dig" (August, 
2017). Those that do cultivate in the south grow mainly 
beans, cassava or maize. Previous expertise often gets 
lost as the rural and remote environment of the  
settlements hardly offers alternative employment  
opportunities, and those with non-agricultural skills 
hardly have any livelihood option there. The following 
quote illustrates such disrupted livelihood 
trajectories: 
I reached the reception centre on 1 July 2016. When 
the war began, soldiers attacked our village, and my 
sister was killed. I fled to the bush with my own four 
children plus the four orphans of my sister. We 
walked for 12 days—only me with eight children. 
While we fled, I got separated from my husband. I 
formerly worked for Mine Action and had a small 
trading business. Agriculture is completely new for 
me. We are starting a new life here. I am stranded. 
There is nothing we can do here (young woman from 
Lainya, Yei River State during a group discussion 
with a Farmer Field Group from Yei River State, re-
cently arrived in July and August 2016, Rhino Camp 
refugee settlement, Ocea Zone, Katiku, 3 July 2017).
Shortage of water
The sustainability of the settlement approach is 
also challenged by the shortage of water—the lack of 
rain in the summer of 2017 and dropping groundwater 
level have a profound effect on the communities in 
the West Nile and the southern region. In the south, 
near Nakivali settlement, a small lake is the only 
source of water that, for one, is drying out and, for the 
other, not very clean. As a Congolese refugee describes: 
"The problem is water: A challenge in the long dry sea-
son" (21-year-old DRC refugee, Nakivali, August 2017). 
A 46-year-old woman from the local community in 
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 language skills can find longer-term jobs with inter-
national aid agencies, such as hygiene promoter or 
translator. Also, many skill training activities offered 
by agencies were in English and not in Arabic or oth-
er local languages spoken by most of the refugees (fo-
cus group discussion, Rhino Camp refugee settlement, 
July 2017). Consequently, not many refugees can take 
part in the training activities or have the possibility 
to apply for the few jobs available.
The primary income-generating activities for ref-
ugees and Ugandans in areas receiving the most refu-
gees are brick-making, retail trading and selling fruit 
and vegetables, such as tomatoes and bananas, or 
making soap. In the south, refugees, for example, try 
to access bigger markets, such as Bakere near Kyaka II, 
where they get fruit cheaper and then sell the same 
fruit at a higher price within their village. In the 
north, not many opportunities besides agriculture 
exist. But considering all constraints as pointed out 
above, there is seldom any surplus that can be sold. 
Some refugees and receiving communities or-
ganise themselves with or without the help of aid 
agencies in farmer field groups, where they cultivate 
a field together. Others create saving groups that give 
loans to some members of the group. Many complain 
that the loan is often not sufficient to start a business, 
even if the required skills are present.
The few who have businesses in the marginalised 
north explain that there are few markets and "no 
buyers". As all have little, both refugees and local 
Ugandans, there is a lack of purchasing power. In the 
south, small businesses are more widespread, par-
ticularly in the base camp of Nakivale because it is 
like "a capital" (24-year-old male, Burundian refugee, 
Nakivali, August 2017). Tailoring has, for example, in-
creased the income of some refugee families after 
women were trained by aid agencies and received 
knitting machines in Juru, Nakivali. Yet, this has also 
enhanced competition and jealousy between those 
 
sorghum per month) many receive only half or even less now. As a  
result of this, many refugees as well as parts of the receiving commu-
nities suffer from hunger (especially in Yumbe and particularly those 
without alternative income sources but who solely rely on food distri-
butions and/or their small plots of land).
between refugees and Ugandans, sometimes escalat-
ing violently (see pp. 25).
To conclude this chapter, our results demonstrate 
the limitations of the settlement approach in Uganda 
with regard to access to land and water. In practice, 
livelihood conditions in the Ugandan refugee settle-
ments do not differ considerably from traditional 
camps elsewhere, and conditions for self-sufficiency 
in most cases remain dire.
Access to employment, training and 
business opportunities
This section analyses the factors that enable and 
restrict refugees’ access to employment, training and 
business opportunities.
Few and unsustainable job opportunities
Besides the quality and size of arable land as well 
as access to water, access to employment can be an 
important facilitator for integration. In Uganda, all 
refugee groups have the right to work as is enshrined 
in the Ugandan Refugee Act from 2006, Article 29(1) 
(UNDP, 2017). Yet, many refugees in the refugee settle-
ments have little employment opportunities, let 
alone sustainable ones. In Nakivale refugee settle-
ment in the south, Somali refugees hire Congolese or 
Rwandan refugees, for example, to do the laundry or 
fetch water for them. In the north, refugees reported 
hiring Ugandans for cultivating land, building houses 
or digging out latrines. Less frequently, refugees are 
hired by Ugandans (see pp. 20).
Often, aid agencies are the only employers in the 
region where refugee settlements are located, espe-
cially in the north of the country. Yet, work with aid 
agencies is often restricted to a short period and not 
sustainable. 13 Besides, only those with English 
13 \  For example, in Boroli refugee settlement, some refugees expressed 
that they got an income as "food unloaders" with aid agencies when 
the day of food distribution comes. Yet, this happens only on a few 
days and is not enough to guarantee an income. Thus, some refugees 
also sell part of their food ration to other refugees or Ugandans, even 
when the food ration is not enough for themselves. The aim behind is 
that they can also buy something different, for example, diversify their 
food or buy soap or other necessary household items or even pay school 
fees. Food rations are often also shortened due to funding delays. While 
in the beginning, some received 12kg of food (grains, such as maize or 
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The north has long been neglected by the central 
government
In Uganda, refugees are mainly administered 
centrally through the Office of the Prime Minister  
(OPM) and UNHCR. This centralistic approach has  
advantages from a management perspective in that it 
facilitates coherent management of refugees, yet it 
also causes several problems. For one, it delays activi-
ties and projects of aid organisations as everything 
needs to be coordinated with OPM in Kampala, first. 
While there are representatives of OPM at each set-
tlement location (the settlement commandants and/
or their subordinates), they often need prior approval 
from headquarters through the refugee desk offices 
in the regions—such as in Arua and Adjumani towns. 
There is a lack of coordination and information ex-
change between districts and regions which have dif-
ferent interests and aims. For the other, local govern-
ment and district officials often feel insufficiently 
informed about the activities planned or conducted 
by OPM and aid organisations in their districts, which 
leads to mistrust. Frustration and resentment among 
local governments towards the central government  
is widespread, as the northern parts of Uganda have 
experienced a long history of marginalisation and 
negligence by the central government—the supporters 
of President Yoweri Museveni are rather from the 
central and western regions. The poverty line is the 
highest in the northern region, which is also the 
least represented politically (Hitchen, 2017). Conse-
quently, job opportunities not only for refugees but 
also for the local population are rare. The centralised 
administration of ReHoPE by the OPM bears the  
risk of constructing a parallel system to the existing 
local institutions at the district and sub-county level. 
Currently, they are underfunded and do not have the 
capacity to manage the refugee influx. Aid organisa-
tions step in to fill the gap of support in the north, 
contributing to a perpetuation of the Ugandan  
central government’s politics of neglect towards the 
north. 
In some settlements, the situation of the local 
Ugandan population is worse than that of refugees, 
who receive food aid whereas the Ugandans do not.  
who were successful and those who were not. Ideally, 
some women would have entered different markets 
and accessed buyers outside their village. Neverthe-
less, moving to another village or outside the refugee 
settlement is not that easy because in practice, free-
dom of movement is restricted, as will be outlined be-
low. Thus, many refugees interviewed never went out-
side their settlement. This is true both in the north 
and south of Uganda.
While in the south, more small businesses are 
widespread, many refugees still do not have a job or 
state that it is "very tough to get an income" (24-year-
old Burundian refugee, Bujumbura near Nakivali, Au-
gust 2017). The income from a small shop where they 
sell charcoal, fruit, rice, maize and oil, for example, is 
not enough to sustain a living. Only through support, 
such as rent that one woman received from Burundi, 
can she provide for herself (interview with 45-year-
old Burundian refugee, Oruchinga, September 2017). 
There are also tensions between those businesses or 
associations, such as youth groups, that receive sup-
port from others, such as aid organisations, and those 
that do not, explains another refugee (interview with 
Burundian refugee, Nakivali, August 2017). The unequal 
distribution of aid to refugees is also a cause of ten-
sion among refugees. 
As many refugees or local Ugandans do not find 
jobs, have nothing to do or do not earn enough to 
make a living, they turn to other activities. Several 
aid agencies pointed out the problem of gambling 
and sport-betting within refugee settlements, both in 
the north and the south. Yet, these negative coping 
strategies are neither sustainable nor do they foster 
self-reliance, but rather create social tensions. Wives 
of the mostly male gamblers complain that they 
spend all the money, and this leads to quarrels within 
families. 
In the capital Kampala, too, employment oppor-
tunities for refugees are scarce. Many of the mostly 
Congolese and Somali refugees in Kampala work in 
the informal sector, but due to the growing competi-
tion, they cannot earn enough money to meet the  
basic needs (Montheith et al., 2017). They often live in 
slums or other informal settlements (Addaney, 2017). 
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houses. They often remain registered in the settlements, 
but either give their distribution cards to other people 
(to receive rations for them on distribution dates) or 
come to the settlements only to receive their rations 
on a specific date and take them to town.
Despite the tense security situation in the border-
lands and frequent attacks by the warring factions 14 
on the transit roads, movement to South Sudan takes 
place: 
While the majority of the South Sudanese who find 
safety in the refugee camps [settlements] have not 
moved anywhere apart from the movements within 
the camps […], a small portion of refugees keeps 
moving between Uganda and South Sudan. Most of 
the reasons for these movements are either to search 
for jobs back home or to visit their relatives. Some 
also return to South Sudan to process their money 
trapped in the banks so as to establish some busi-
nesses in the camps—like a grinding mill as a source 
of livelihood (interview with 42-year-old South  
Sudanese, Director of South Sudan Integrated Mine 
Action Service, whose family fled to Kampala–Uganda. 
Juba, April 2018).
Others reportedly return temporarily to bring in 
the harvest or take care of their cattle which they are 
not allowed to bring to Uganda.
Even though refugees have the right of free move-
ment, some do not know about it, and some are still 
stopped by police or government officials on occa-
sions and report that they are required to get a permit 
to be allowed to travel beyond West Nile from the ref-
ugee settlements. There are several checkpoints on 
the road, particularly to Kampala. If one does not 
have a travel document, one can get arrested (report 
of a South Sudanese refugee from Arua town, July 
2017). Cars with a South Sudanese license plate seem 
to be stopped more frequently than Ugandan cars  
(interview with 38-year-old South Sudanese male 
from Yei River State, Pojulu, Arua, March 2018). Also in 
14 \  The SPLA-IO is a main South Sudanese political party and rebel group 
that split from the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) 
party and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) – then South Su-
danese national army in December 2013, due to political tensions 
which turned violent between President Salva Kiir and Vice President 
Riek Machar over leadership of the SPLM (now SPLA is renamed as 
‘South Sudan People’s Defense Force – SSPDF).
A refugee representative in the Boroli refugee settle-
ment comments: “The nationals here are also suffering” 
(interview with refugee representative, July 2017). 
“Refugees and hosts have the same problem: The 
shortage of food” (interview with a Dinka woman 
who arrived in 1987, Rhino Camp refugee settlement, 
July 2017). 
Freedom of movement in practice restricted 
In principle, refugees have the right to move freely 
in Uganda. However, there is a variety of mostly 
structural factors that impede mobility. The poor road 
or transport infrastructure for instance constrains 
the mobility of settlement-based refugees and that of 
members of the receiving communities. Most of the 
refugee settlements are located in remote areas. In 
Nakivale, the only possibility to move at night is to 
use transport trolleys. The next bigger town is 60 km 
away. In northern Uganda, women reported not going 
out because they were afraid of assaults. 
This year some Kakwa attacked a Dinka lady in a car. 
Since that incident, we only enter a car to Arua when 
the driver is a national [Ugandan]. It is even more 
difficult for the Dinka to travel in-between the clus-
ters because Equatorians are settled there. There have 
been three security incidents where Dinka women and 
children in cars were attacked since 2015/16 (focus 
group discussion with Dinka, Odobu I, Rhino Camp 
refugee settlement, 10 July 2018).
Refugees did not only mention being afraid of  
fellow refugees but also the local receiving community. 
“The refugees are afraid that they may be harmed by 
the natives if they move freely because sometimes 
there are bad feelings from the natives as they be-
lieve that the refugees have come to grab their land” 
(interview with a 26-year-old South Sudanese woman 
based in Rhino Camp refugee settlement who fled in 
July 2016 from Yei and returned to Yei in February 
2018, Nyangbara tribe, Arua town, October 2017). 
Besides security-related constraints to free move-
ment, financial constraints also play a role. Transpor-
tation is expensive, and many people in remote areas 
cannot afford it. Only the better-off manage to move 
from the settlements to the town where they rent 
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remain small, and vocational training opportunities 
are limited, with the funding attention of aid organi-
sations having shifted away from the south of Ugan-
da and now focussing on the new South Sudanese ar-
rivals in northern Uganda (and to some extent new 
Congolese arrivals in Kyangwale refugee settlement, 
western Uganda). 
In this Chapter, the authors have shown that  
despite the right of refugees to work in Uganda,  
employment opportunities are minimal due to the 
remote location of many settlements within econom-
ically weak regions of the country, considerable con-
straints to the freedom of movement and insufficient 
education and training opportunities. Even self-set-
tled refugees who, in the case of Arua, seem to be a lot 
more mobile and connected to translocal networks 
that often provide them with opportunities for busi-
nesses are struggling.
Intergroup relations
A description of the intergroup relations between 
refugee and receiving communities needs to take 
into account that neither refugees nor the Ugandan 
receiving communities are a homogeneous or a static 
group, but represent a variety of groups with different 
cultural and historical backgrounds, forms of liveli-
hoods, etc. Relations and power hierarchies thus differ 
considerably in Ugandan regions and settlement areas, 
between settlement-based and urban refugees and 
between old and new arrivals. Moreover, relation-
ships and power hierarchies are constantly changing 
due to ever-changing conflict dynamics and the po-
litical and humanitarian settings in which they are 
embedded, high population movements among dis-
placed persons (circular movements, multiple dis-
placements, onwards mobility) and evolving translocal 
support networks.
Socio-economic status commonalities and differ-
ences among refugees and Ugandans
Intra- and intercommunal relations are very 
much shaped by socio-economic status differences 
between refugees and local Ugandans as well as 
in-between different refugee groups. Regarding 
Kyaka II, in south-west Uganda, an NGO officer re-
ported that refugees often need a permit from OPM 
when they want to travel outside the refugee settle-
ment (Kyaka II, September 2017). Because of these 
hindrances, many refugees are afraid to or cannot 
move freely and thus, can also not access other mar-
kets or find jobs elsewhere. 
Sense of hopelessness and limited opportunities for 
secondary education
Among many refugees who have been in Uganda 
for a very long time, such as those in the southern 
settlements, a sense of hopelessness prevails. For 
them, the only hope, as they say, is resettlement, al-
though the quotas have been reduced dramatically. 
Because of the poor prospects of finding a job, some 
parents and refugee youth in the southern settle-
ments consider education unnecessary. For many 
other young people, however, education is a high  
priority. 60 per cent of the refugees in Uganda are 
children (UNHCR, 2018e).
Because of insufficient numbers of school build-
ings, school is often cancelled because of rain once 
the rainy season has started, as teaching takes place 
outside (UNHCR, 2018l). Although there are no school 
fees for public primary schools as such, parents of  
refugee and Ugandan children alike have to pay for 
school uniforms, lunch and materials, repairs or a so-
called development fee. Secondary schools are costly. 
Students who are better off prefer private schools  
despite their high costs because compared to public 
schools, there are fewer students and the quality of 
teaching is much better. 
Yet, there are also many positive examples of 
training and small business enterprises that have 
been developed with the help of aid organisations 
who have provided refugees with micro-credits.  
Refugees themselves have organised themselves in 
different refugee associations, for instance in support 
of orphans and for film-making. They have also estab-
lished an information-sharing portal. In Nakivale, 
refugee teachers have come together to run own 
schools, even though they suffer from the same lack 
of infrastructure as the regular schools. Still, the 
numbers of successful businesses and associations 
UGANDA: A ROLE MODEL FOR REFUGEE INTEGRATION?\ E. BOHNET & C. SCHMITZ-PRANGHE   
21 \ \ WORKING PAPER 2  \ 2019
businesses. 15 It is very common for the better-off 
South Sudanese (e.g. those occupying government 
posts in South Sudan or working in the international 
humanitarian sector in South Sudan, Somalia or else-
where or those living in the United States, Asia and 
Australia) to support South Sudanese relatives in 
Uganda. Many self-settled South Sudanese in Arua 
have also been to Uganda before as educational mi-
grants, and we find numerous South Sudanese business-
men who maintain transnational business and political 
networks in the region or even worldwide. Others 
have succeeded to establish new businesses in Uganda. 
Accordingly, it has been repeatedly stated by Ugandans 
and South Sudanese alike that South Sudanese in 
Arua do not take up 3D (dirty, dangerous, demeaning) 
jobs but rather local Ugandans. This indicates that 
livelihood conditions, especially in economic terms, 
are a lot better for the educational and economic 
elites among South Sudanese refugees than for settle-
ment-based refugees and many local Ugandans. 16 
Yet, being dependent on the translocal support 
networks often counteracts efforts aiming at achieving 
self-reliance. The high dependency of self-settled in-
dividual South Sudanese refugees or even entire com-
munities in Arua on these networks becomes visible 
for instance when the flow of remittances dries up as 
is reflected in the following quote:
The community went through difficult times, which 
included the killing of a community member who had 
worked with the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) in South Sudan and his brother—
both at the former’s home in Juba. Their family, 
which was in Arua had to be relocated to the refugee 
settlement, as they were no longer able to afford life 
in Arua town without the support of the breadwinner  
from South Sudan (focus group discussion with 
Moru men, Arua, October 2017).
15 \  In some cases, remittances enable individuals to set up businesses as 
it was the case of John, who lives with his family in his brother’s 
house in Pajulu Sub-County, Arua district. His brother is a business-
man in Juba and sends remittances to the family. The rations he is 
still receiving in Imvepi refugee settlement are used additionally to be 
sold in the small shop he set up with the help of these remittances (in-
terview with South Sudanese Pojulu, Pajulu Sub-County, Arua District, 
March 2018).
16 \  In contrast, in Kampala, the majority of urban refugees are from DRC 
and Somalia and often live in the slums or other informal settlements 
and work in the informal sector (Montheith et al., 2017; Addaney, 2017).
relations and power structures between receiving 
communities and refugees, the concept of “estab-
lished” and “outsiders” by Elias and Scotson (1965) 
has been applied to displacement contexts (Grawert 
& Mielke, 2018). According to Elias and Scotson, power 
hierarchies are shaped by the higher degree of social 
cohesion within the community of the “established” 
compared to the “outsiders” and by stigmatisation of 
the “outsiders”. In the Ugandan case, much more rel-
evant for the power hierarchy of receiving communi-
ties and refugees than questions of social cohesion 
seem to be differences in the socio-economic status 
between different  groups. Important factors explain-
ing socio-economic status differences are access to 
resources, i.e. the receipt of humanitarian aid (in-
kind and cash assistance), financial assets, translocal 
support structures and the resulting opportunities 
for spacial and social mobility. 
Especially in the remote parts of the West Nile 
region, the livelihood conditions of local Ugandans 
are often very bad, and refugees and Ugandans face 
similar challenges in agricultural production. Due to 
the rations distributed by international aid organisa-
tions to newly arrived refugees, the socio-economic 
status of these in some cases exceeds not only the 
status of refugees who had arrived earlier in the set-
tlements and thus no longer receive rations, but also 
of some local Ugandans. This affects social interaction 
and employment patterns in particular: In the northern 
refugee settlements, aid frequently enables refugees 
to hire either old arrivals (see pp. 17) or local Ugandans 
for constructing their houses or digging out the  
latrines in exchange for food, while it is a lot less fre-
quent that Ugandans hire South Sudanese, reportedly 
because the local population has nothing to pay them 
with. Often, old arrivals of South Sudanese refugees  
depend entirely on this income source (interview  
female South Sudanese refugee, Dinka, who fled to 
Uganda in 1987, Rhino Camp refugee settlement, July 
2017).  
In the town of Arua, remittances decisively influ-
ence the socio-economic status of South Sudanese 
refugees and enable the South Sudanese educational 
elite to self-settle in the district capitals rather than 
being allocated to one of the refugee settlements, to 
stay at a boarding school in Uganda or to set up 
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The extent to which the socio-economic status 
shapes intergroup relations is illustrated by reports of 
several interviewees about discriminatory practices 
that are based on the assumption that South Sudanese 
are generally better-off than the local population:
Sometimes, they [South Sudanese] get mistreatment 
from people in Uganda; like in the hospitals, where 
they do not treat them fairly. At times, they give 
drugs to the Ugandans freely, but ask for money from 
the South Sudanese. […] There is a community water 
well which charges each family that fetches water 
from it about two thousand Ugandan Shillings 
(UGX) [€0.48] for three times in a year, but they over-
charge the South Sudanese to pay 3000 UGX [€ 0.72] 
or 4000 UGX [0.96€] per family, that is 12000 UGX 
[2.16€] per family per year, respectively. But […] one 
can buy a jerry can of water at 200 UGX [0.04€], 
without any discrimination (interview with Lugbara 
Ugandan woman, Pajulu sub county, Arua district, 
September 2017).
Therefore refugee livelihoods in Uganda cannot 
be generalized, since the conditions of old vs. new  
arrivals and settlement-based and self-settled refugees 
differ considerably. Especially in the southern part of 
Uganda where mostly Burundians and Congolese are 
settled, their situation is  a lot worse than that of the 
local population. Besides, even if in some cases, settle-
ment-based and self-settled refugees are equally well- 
or better-off than the local Ugandan population, it by 
far does not mean that the refugees are self-reliant: 
Most remain highly dependent either on aid or  
remittances, and their livelihood situation often  
remains difficult.
Cultural commonalities & differences between 
South Sudanese and Ugandan ethnolinguistic 
groups
The relationship between Ugandans and South 
Sudanese is also determined in part by cultural ties 
and ethnolinguistic commonalities. Belonging to a 
specific group often does not depend on nation- 
state-related categories, but rather on ethnolinguistic 
relations that predate colonial border making. 17 
Several ethnolinguistic groups span across the  
borders between South Sudan, Uganda and the DRC, 
most prominently the Kakwa, Acholi and the Lugbara, 
while the Mundu, Keliko and Avokaya are in South 
Sudan and the DRC. 18 
Ever since there have been close contacts and 
continuous cross-border flows of people and com-
modities, enhancing what Leopold calls “peoples’ 
ideas of cultural and political community” (2009, 
p. 475). Ethno-cultural commonalities have a direct 
impact on the acceptance of refugee settlements: 
For example, in Koboko, where the natives are Kakwa, 
many Kakwa from South Sudan seem well received 
‘back home’. Many had established here earlier and 
had their families in Koboko town. There were efforts 
from South Sudanese and Ugandan Kakwas alike 
to have some settlements established around 
Koboko so that their people could be near. That  
resulted in the creation of Lobule refugee settlement 
in Koboko […] (interview with 38-year-old Kakwa 
from Yei, Arua town, April 2018).
Besides ethnocultural ties, a common language 
also plays a role in the effort to locally integrate: 
Our relationship with the Ugandans is not all that 
bad. Because of the [similar] language [Lugbara 
and Lulu’bo], we can communicate with the Ugandans. 
There is no communication barrier. They consider 
us as some of them […]” (interview with 21-year-
old male Lulu’bo from former Juba county (former 
Central Equatoria State), Pajulu sub-county, Arua 
district, October 2017).
17 \  For an in-depth discussion on the ethnolinguistic landscape of 
Eastern Africa and questions of belonging see for example Leopold, 
2009.
18 \  The ethnolinguistic groups on both sides of the South-Sudanese 
and Ugandan border share a history of marginalisation and being 
different from the dominant ethnolinguistic groups of both coun-
tries. The main goups of Uganda’s West Nile region are the Lugbara, 
Madi, Kakwa and Alur. With the exception of the Alur, these are 
speakers of Sudanic rather than Nilotic languages and are agricul-
turalists, not pastoralists, unlike those in other parts of northern 
Uganda, such as the Acholi and Langi peoples or the Karamojong 
(Leopold, 2009). Also the Equatorian people on the South Sudan side 
of the border, such as the Kuku and the Bari, are linguistically and 
culturally different from the majority of and dominant South Suda-
nese groups such as the Nuer and Dinka.
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Houses of refugees and nationals are not mixed” 
(meeting with OPM official, Bidi Bidi, Zone 1, village 1, 
July 2017). Another interviewee even stated: “Refugees 
are limited to the areas provided to them by UNHCR. 
[…] Refugees are not allowed to settle with citizens, 
except through intermarriages” (interview with male 
South Sudanese, Kuku, Arua, April 2018). 
Refugees and local Ugandans alike reported that 
contact takes place at the market, at school, at the 
water points and health, worship and recreational 
centres. The degree of separation of receiving com-
munities and refugee households not only depends 
on the location of plots assigned to refugees by OPM 
but also on the deliberate settlement preferences of 
refugees and Ugandans alike: Some refugees reported 
that they preferred to settle close to their compatriots 
instead of being settled apart or in-between the local 
population. Some even accepted to share plots and 
have less space for building their house and for culti-
vating, just to be able to be close to relatives or other 
members of their community. Security concerns, as 
in the case of the Dinka, also played a role for the 
wish to settle together with other Dinka (see below). 
Yet, we also observed that, once refugees had been 
settled in one area, Ugandans settled around them, 
reportedly to gain better access to services provided 
by aid agencies (e.g. boreholes, schools, health centres, 
etc.) to these new settlements. Various interviewees 
also reported that both groups came together to cele-
brate ceremonies such as marriages and funerals.  
Especially in very remote areas and areas with scarce 
resources, Ugandans reported that they were happy 
about the South Sudanese settlers and actively pursued 
relationships with the refugees and supported one 
another.
I learn Arabic to better communicate with the refugees, 
and some of the refugees also already picked up some 
Lugbara. Before the refugees arrived, I felt lonely, 
since I stayed only with my grandfather, who passed 
away recently (focus group discussion with WHH 
farmer field group comprising both refugees and 
Ugandans, Rhino Camp refugee settlement, Eden, 
July 2017).
Accordingly, the interviewed refugees often  
mentioned that speaking different languages im-
pedes local integration. To overcome the language 
barrier, especially those refugees who had spent years 
or decades already in Uganda reported that they pro-
actively learned the local language, e.g. Lugbara. 
Moreover, Arabic (north) and Swahili (south) are  
often used as lingua franca.
Interethnic marriages between Ugandans and 
South Sudanese are quite rare as high dowries—espe-
cially for Nuer and Dinka women—impede intermar-
riages, as many interviewees confirm. Where in-
terethnic marriages happen, these might, on the one 
hand, illustrate close contact and trustful relation-
ships between some communities and, on the other, 
be a result of the families’ economic needs.
Besides sociocultural commonalities, the inter-
viewed aid organisations highlighted the shared ex-
perience of displacement of the Ugandan West Nile 
population and South Sudanese refugees as a factor 
contributing to the empathy and solidarity of the 
Ugandan local community. It is estimated that at that 
time, some 90 per cent of the population of northern 
Uganda were uprooted as a result of conflict between 
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the govern-
ment (Leopold, 2009, p. 472).
Impact of the settlement structure on  
social relations
The Ugandan settlement policy in its official dis-
course strives for mixed settlements, i.e. villages 
where there is a mix of Ugandan and refugee house-
holds. We find mixed settlements especially among 
the Ugandan population and refugees who have not 
returned during one of the main return movements 
after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 
2005 and independence in 2011. 19 However, in the ma-
jority of these “mixed” settlements, we find signs of 
segregation. The Ugandan communities live in one 
part of the settlement, and the refugee communities 
live away from them, e.g. on the other side of the road 
or around the newly established refugee settlements. 
“The nationals settle at the outskirts of the village. 
19 \  These South Sudanese refugees are usually referred to as the old 
‘caseloads’.
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For a 26-year-old South Sudanese woman from 
Lujulo county in Yei River State, the comparable socio- 
economic condition of refugees and some local Ugan-
dans as well as the direct benefit from international 
aid positively affects intercommunal relations: “In 
the refugee camps, the poor refugees relate well with 
the poor host community, because they know they 
benefit. Part of the food, though little, is exchanged 
for firewood brought by the host community” (inter-
view with a South Sudanese female from Lujulo 
county, Yei River State, Pajulu Sub-county, Arua dis-
trict, March 2018).
Also in Adjumani, the conditions for establishing 
refugee settlements seem to be favourable. 
There is enough land here. The hosts have a lot of 
land, but lack the workforce to tend it and to sow the 
seeds. That is why they provide land to the refugees. 
You can already see an impact, but mostly for those 
of the host communities who directly benefit from 
the projects” (interview with representative of the 
Welthungerhilfe, Adjumani/Pakele, July 2017).
In contrast, in the Bidi Bidi refugee settlement 
which was [re]opened in 2016, 21 the receiving popula-
tion that is mainly Muslim Aringa seemed to be a lot 
more hesitant and openly criticised the actual share 
of international aid for local communities. A REACH 
survey also describes the perceived strain on local 
services and resources, especially in Yumbe district 
(REACH & USAID 2018).
As a district government representative in Yumbe 
explained:
All development focuses on Arua. [In Bidi Bidi] a  
vulnerable population is hosted by a vulnerable population. 
[…] There is too much pressure on the roads because 
of water trucking; schools are overstrained, there is a 
water shortage, and we're facing the environmental 
impact due to the households’ dependency on wood 
for cooking (meeting with a District Government 
representative, Yumbe district, July 1017).
21 \  Bidi Bidi was established in the 1990s during the second Sudanese 
civil war between the SPLA and successive regimes in Khartoum.
While in the north of the country, many refugee 
settlements and Ugandan villages are located side by 
side as described above, refugees in the south, such as 
in Nakivale, live mostly separated from locals.This 
also holds true for the base camp, the main settlement 
within Nakivale. Rubonga, a village within Nakivali, 
is an exception: Here, locals live among refugees. So 
generally, the interaction between locals and refugees 
is limited because opportunities to meet are little. 
While Burundian, Congolese and Rwandan refugees 
often stay next to each other and mix, in the majority 
of villages, one group is still dominant, and Somalis 
who are also present in Nakivale live on their own. “It 
is their wish”, NGO workers explain. The same holds 
for Kenyans and Ethiopians. In conclusion, one could 
posit that, overall, the ‘mixed’ settlements are not  
really mixed. Refugee groups still stay within their 
ethnic kin and language group. An NGO employee 
states that "tribal connections are stronger than  
national ones". Social integration in the local Ugandan 
communities of the south thus only rarely takes 
place.
Perceived benefits from the refugees’ presence
Relations between refugees and local Ugandan 
communities are particularly good where receiving 
communities directly benefit from the refugees’ pres-
ence, even if interaction remains limited. The willing-
ness of the local population to provide land for a refu-
gee settlement thus differs considerably depending 
on the general availability of land and the expected 
benefit from interventions funded by international 
agencies.
According to several interviews, the local Ugandan 
community of Rhino camp which was established as 
early as in 1980, overwhelmingly welcomed the new 
refugees (those arriving since 2016) and was willing 
to provide land for residential and farming areas of 
the settlement. 20 The region has been politically and 
economically marginalised. Soil quality is poor, and 
livelihoods are often secured by fishing. The Ugandan 
population thus perceives to benefit from increased 
national and international attention and the newly 
built infrastructure. 
20 \  The recent addition of Omugo zone to the settlement illustrates the 
cooperation of local communities (UNHCR, 2018l).
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and UNHCR originally aimed for ethnically mixed 
settlements. But as more violent confrontations  
occurred, Dinka 22 are now often settled apart from 
the other tribes or deliberately chosen to settle with 
fellow Dinka to feel safer. 
Besides violent interethnic clashes, the protec-
tion of refugees is both in the north and the south 
considerably affected by sexual and gender-based vio-
lence (SGBV), the perpetrators often being husbands 
or other male community members (focus group dis-
cussion with South Sudanese women, Bidi Bidi, July 
2017). 23 Several female refugees mentioned SGBV  as a 
big problem, especially because of stigmatisation and 
"isolation after rape" (ex. in Nakivale). A problem that 
was also addressed by a 25-year-old female Burundian 
refugee: "There is no punishment for perpetrators" 
(interview, Oruchinga, August 2017). Sports betting, 
gambling and drinking alcohol has also created pro-
tection risks in both the southern and the northern 
regions, as outlined in the previous section.
Despite the fact that only minor conflicts among 
refugees have been recorded in the south of Uganda, 
many do not feel safe from fellow refugees. They have 
reported small-scale violence and incidences and are 
suspicious of "newcomers". For example, some Bu-
rundians explained that they fear that the newcom-
ers are spies from the Burundian government. Some 
fighting occurred during power struggles before elec-
tions of new chairpersons and refugee leaders. Bu-
rundian women in Oruchinga, for example, com-
plained of violence because of the campaigning. 
Although we do not find any systematic violence 
between Ugandan and refugee communities, there 
are various issues that lead to small-scale conflict 
that sometimes turn violent. So far, these conflicts 
largely stay on the micro level. However, we also 
found violent interethnic confrontations within the 
settlements causing evacuations of humanitarian 
staff and refugees and relocations of (especially Dinka) 
refugees to other villages. Tensions between refugees 
and members of local communities—both in Uganda's 
northern and southern regions—arise mainly from 
22 \  Many of the Equatorian ethnolinguistic groups make the Dinka  
responsible for the escalation of violence in 2016/17 in the Equatorias.
23 \  For an in-depth discussion of SGBV in refugee settlements see for  
example Krause, 2015.
These research findings indicate the strong influ-
ence of socio-economic conditions in the receiving 
areas and the settlement structure and aid delivery 
on the one hand and remittances on the other on  
intergroup relations of refugees and local Ugandans. 
These intergroup relations impact on a) employment, 
b) settlement and c) mobility patterns and thus on 
livelihood options of both refugees and local Ugandan 
communities. This becomes obvious also in the  
differences of livelihood options of settlement-based 
and self-settled refugees.
Conflict and protection
In the past, refugee settlements in northern 
Uganda were attacked by armed groups. The LRA’s 
attack on Kitgum’s Acholi-Pii camp in 1997 led to the 
death of 100 refugees, and attacks on Maaji settlement 
in Adjumani district in 2002 displaced thousands of 
refugees (IRIN, 2002). In 1996/97, the West Nile Bank 
Front targeted Bidi Bidi and surrounding settlements. 
These incidents resulted in deaths and relocations. 
Some of the refugees left for then Southern Sudan, 
while others fled to Ugandan towns like Arua and 
Koboko, and others were relocated to other refugee 
settlements (information by South Sudanese male, 
Kakwa, Arua, November 2018). In Palorinya settlement 
in Moyo district, intercommunal relations remain 
strained as a result of a previous border conflict in 
2014 that caused the renewed displacement of more 
than thousand (then) Sudanese Kuku refugees by the 
local Ugandan Madi population. Reportedly, many 
newly arrived refugees in Moyo would have preferred 
to be settled elsewhere (information by South Suda-
nese male, Kakwa, Arua, July 2017). 
Compared to those years, the security situation in 
the settlements has considerably improved, and most 
of the refugees we talked to felt relatively safe from 
attacks in the settlements. Violent confrontations are 
sporadic and small-scale and mostly related to inter- 
ethnic conflicts between the Dinka and other groups 
from South Sudan. These, however, have led to deaths, 
displacements and evacuations and the relocation of 
ethnolinguistic groups, mostly Dinka, to separate 
them from their adversaries (UNHCR, 2018k). OPM 
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Kakwa women, Rhino Camp refugee settlement, July 
2017), fellow refugees drive nails in the water contain-
ers making them useless and that there are quarrels 
at the water points.
Frequently, conflicts arise between agriculturalists 
and cattle-keepers; agriculturalists complain about 
free-roaming cattle belonging both to Ugandans and 
refugees that destroy their crops. 
Access to aid has been perceived as a conflict issue 
not only by Ugandans but also by refugees. Women in 
Bidi Bidi reported that they “fear and have been 
threatened, that nationals will do something bad to 
them, if the aid agencies don’t provide support for 
them. We’re still living in fear and don’t feel safe”  
(focus group discussion at women´s centre, Bidi Bidi, 
Zone 3, village 1). Ugandans whom we interviewed  
described tensions over the distribution of aid:
When the refugees entered Uganda, UN agencies 
focused on the needs of refugees. Thus, the refugees 
were doing well while members of the host community 
were badly off, causing conflict between the refugees 
and the hosts. The refugees were given food and other 
assistance while living on the land of the host com-
munity. This caused problems with some camps. The 
government of Uganda said that host community 
should be focused on as well, sharing services, such 
as hospitals and learning with refugees in schools 
and other training measures. The host community 
now sees they are also benefiting, and there is a 
peaceful co-existence here in the integration of the 
refugees into the host communities” (interview with 
South Sudanese male, (Kuku), project officer at Youth 
With A Mission, Arua town, October 2017).
Another conflict issue mentioned both by  
refugees and Ugandans was employment.
[…] the locals claim that they don’t get jobs in the 
refugee settlements, but instead other Ugandans, 
mainly from south-western Uganda get the jobs.  
In some instances, youth from the refugee-hosting 
communities blocked roads leading to the refugee  
settlements and demanded that the refugees be relo-
cated to where the Ugandan employees in the refugee 
settlements come from. These incidents leave the  
competition for natural resources, such as water and 
firewood, and competition for aid distributed by in-
ternational agencies. As a 38-year-old female from  
Burundi stated in Oruchinga: “They are fighting over 
water with the local communities, as there is only 
one borehole” (interview, September 2017). A conflict 
assessment by Danish Refugee Council (2017) comes 
to similar results: "Conflict related to lack of social 
cohesion or tribal issues is not the primary cause of 
conflict. Instead small-scale conflict over natural re-
sources, especially water, and conflict over aid espe-
cially food is more prevalent" (DRC, 2017, p. 5).
Various interviewees in Adjumani, Arua and 
Yumbe Districts reported on conflicts over firewood 
as well as grass that is collected in the bush to thatch 
the houses: “The locals chase us away when we try to 
find firewood. Sometimes, they are armed. That is why 
we stay near the village now”(focus group discussion 
at women’s centre, Bidi Bidi, Zone 3, village 1). A Kakwa 
man from Yei in Arua stated: “The claim is that the 
Ugandans want the South Sudanese to buy such 
items from them rather than getting them for free, 
since the food is distributed to refugees only” (inter-
view with male Kakwa, Arua, July 2017). A Dinka man 
reported that they did not have any problems with 
the locals when they arrived here, but problems grew 
after a while: 
Within a year we lost 100 cows. If we knew who stole 
them, we would go to the police, but we stay here in 
peace. Locals come to the village to offer casual work. 
For us, it is not possible to go to their area. We fear 
the forest. The nationals will chase you. They don’t 
want the refugees to cut building materials but want 
to sell it to them. I once cut grass, was chased away 
and then the grass was set on fire” (focus group dis-
cussion, Odobu I with male and female Dinka, July 
2017).
Moreover, access to water is a conflict issue, espe-
cially in areas where water is very scarce. However, 
there is not only conflict over water between refugee 
and Ugandan communities, but also among refugees. 
Refugees frequently complained that water points are 
claimed by certain groups (group interview with 
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shows that the acquisition of land from Acholi land-
owners in Lamwo district took place without the inclu-
sive consent of the community. Moreover, the Memo-
randum of Understanding (MoU) between the 
landowner and the government of Uganda fails to 
state how long the land will actually be occupied by 
the refugees. 
Our interviews show some evidence on tensions 
about land use and lack of participation in Arua:
I heard that the government gave the land to the ref-
ugees to settle on. The people [natives in the area] 
say it is their land, yet the government says it is its 
land. Thus, the people on whose land the refugees are 
settled feel that the government is forcibly taking 
away their land without compensating them. The 
government cannot take the land like that (interview 
with male Ugandan, Alur, Catholic Catechist, Pajulu 
Sub-County, Arua District, October 2017). 
Another interviewee commented as follows: 
The coming of these people [refugees] has caused land 
shortage and hunger. Whereever these people are, 
there are many misunderstandings between the 
Ugandans and foreigners. The number of people com-
ing has increased so much. The Aringa [the dominant 
ethnolinguistic group in Yumbe District] want to 
claim back their land on which the refugees are set-
tled. They want the government [of Uganda] to give 
back their land (interview with Ugandan Lugbara 
male, businessman, Pajulu Sub-county, Arua district, 
October 2017). 
These statements clearly indicate a risk of future 
land conflict due to the lack of information and par-
ticipation of local communities in the decision-mak-
ing processes.
According to press reports, also in the border 
town of Lamwo, landowners are resisting the reloca-
tion of refugees. Politicians reportedly have been 
stoking tensions by inciting locals to demonstrate in 
the refugee settlements or hamper the delivery of aid. 
In April 2017, armed youths reportedly ambushed a 
convoy in an attempt to stop supplies from reaching 
the settlements (Summers, 2017).
refugees in panic and spoil their relationships with 
the host communities (interview with 38-year-old 
Kakwa from Yei, Arua town, April 2018).
Aid agencies are generally aware of this criticism 
but criticise at the same time that it is difficult to 
hire qualified personnel from the West Nile region. 
Moreover, refugees complain about discriminating 
practices of international aid agencies: “When there 
is community work (construction work) to be done in 
the village, the refugees are supposed to do the work 
voluntarily, while members of the local community 
receive money. This is considered unfair (individual 
interview with a young woman, Bidi Bidi, July 2017). 
In the settlements and in town, it has been re-
ported that the presence of refugees has been putting 
much strain on social services like health and educa-
tion. Moreover, increasing food prices and food shortage 
was ascribed to the influx of South Sudanese:
I understand some of the agencies in charge of the 
visitors [refugees] are cutting down the food ration. 
This […] will affect the locals […]. The little food  
produced by the locals will be sold off, and a famine is 
likely. Some of the visitors are given cash, an equiva-
lent of what is cut from their ration. Thus, the hosts 
will be selling their food to the visitors and not the 
locals that need it just as badly but have less money 
(interview with male Ugandan from Yumbe district, 
Arua, October 2017).
Interestingly and despite the fact that the lack of 
productive land is a significant hindrance to liveli-
hoods, a conflict assessment by the Danish Refugee 
Council (DRC) shows, that both in Rhino Camp and 
Adjumani, conflict over land is negligible compared 
to other conflict issues, e.g. water and firewood (2017, 
p.5). However, other sources reveal that the negotia-
tions over settlements on communities´ land them-
selves entail considerable potential for contestation 
and future conflict. A recent IRRI report shows that it 
remains largely unclear how the communities partic-
ipate in the process and who represents these com-
munities in the negotiations (Zakaryan, 2018). Drawing 
on the example of Lamwo refugee settlement, Zakaryan 
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communities desirable, it is not an end in itself, but 
considered necessary to meet the most urgent needs 
with regard to food, cooking material or the construc-
tion of a house. Likewise, the most frequent types of 
conflicts relate to everyday livelihood activities. How-
ever, interethnic tensions within the South Sudanese 
refugees become more and more prominent, and re-
sistance by local communities to host refugee settle-
ments can be found where people feel that they had 
not been able to participate in the decision to host 
and provide land to refugees and where development 
benefits of the refugees´ presence are not tangible yet.
Interviewees mentioned that conflict dynamics 
and violent incidents in South Sudan affected in-
terethnic relations. According to a representative of a 
South Sudanese NGO, ethnic tensions were greater in 
Bidi Bidi than in Rhino Camp refugee settlement due 
to the fact that
in Rhino, the Dinka came early from South Sudan 
[before conflict escalated in 2016] and came willingly. 
In Bidi Bidi, the Dinka came late and are the ´hard-
liners´ [extremists]. In Bidi Bidi, there are suppos-
edly also more ex-combatants than in Rhino (inter-
view with a representative of a South Sudanese NGO, 
Arua, July 2017).
Another interviewee stated: “The recent Kakwa 
arrivals are in conflict with the Dinka, not the old 
caseloads. To avoid conflict, it’s good to be separated” 
(focus group with Dinka, Odobu II, mixed settlement, 
Rhino Camp, July 2017). This shows that ethnic ten-
sions have increased in the course of conflict—even 
in Uganda. This is related to the fact that in 2016 and 
2017 the Equatorians were increasingly targeted by 
South Sudanese government forces who are perceived 
to be Dinka. Telecommunication is also held respon-
sible for conflict spill-over: “Mobile phones are a 
main conflict source in Uganda. All the news from 
South Sudan immediately spills over. The leaders are 
preaching that the conflict won’t spill over to Uganda, 
but any minor fighting here has been preceded by a 
call from Juba” (focus group discussion with hygiene 
promoters, Bidi Bidi, Zone one, village one, July 2017).
To sum up, the analysis shows that in Uganda, so-
cial integration works best where cultural back-
grounds of receiving communities and refugees are 
similar and the local population directly benefits to a 
large extent from humanitarian and developmental 
support, thus the refugees´ presence. Refugees, espe-
cially recent arrivals, are not integrated yet. Despite a 
policy of mixed settlements, refugees and local Ugan-
dans rather live next to each other, and interactions 
remain superficial. For those, too, who have been in 
Uganda for a long time, social relations with local 
communities remain scarce. Even though many refu-
gees consider social relations with the local 
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However, this consent also heavily relies on the com-
munities’ expectations of being able to benefit from 
infrastructure funded by humanitarian and develop-
mental actors. As soon as the financial back-up by the 
international community decreases, the sustainability 
of the settlement approach might, therefore, be in 
jeopardy. In a nutshell: Uganda’s settlement approach 
remains highly dependent on international support.
Moreover, the settlement approach and its dis-
course of self-reliance neglects self-settled refugees 
who, in most cases, did not integrate in assistance 
structures. Their attempts at social integration as 
well as their economic livelihood strategies are com-
pletely overlooked. Furthermore, it is ignored that  
although most self-settled refugees in the north do 
not receive aid, they remain highly dependent on 
remittances. 
The current focus of aid agencies on the situation 
in the north due to the recent heavy influx of refugees 
is another critical factor of Uganda’s refugee policy. 
Neglecting the situation of refugees in older settle-
ments, such as in the south, and suppressing aid in 
these areas might create new obstacles to refugees in 
attaining self-reliance. Refugees, especially those 
who have already been there for a long time, such as 
Burundians in the south, are frustrated and disillu-
sioned. The lack of hope also pushes some refugees 
into adopting negative coping strategies, be it sports 
betting or drinking alcohol. While there are a few 
who believe that education is not necessary because 
they see no improvement in their situation anyway, 
the majority still hopes for more education and train-
ing opportunities and underlines the necessity of mi-
cro-credits to at least get the chance to start "some-
thing". School children, too, are highly motivated to 
stay in Uganda, at least until they have finished 
school, as the educational opportunities for refugee 
children are very good. 
The analysis of power relations within the refugee 
communities and between refugees and members of 
the receiving communities illustrates the enormous 
impact of socio-economic class and ethnocultural 
factors on settlement patterns, livelihood options and 
strategies, and thus, on the prospects of de facto local 
Even though refugees in Uganda, in theory, have 
access to land, employment and education and have 
the right to free movement, the situation on the 
ground provides a different picture. Our field research 
findings show considerable flaws in Uganda’s refugee 
policy with regard to its sustainability and its aim to 
foster self-reliance of refugees and local communities. 
The settlement approach of providing each refugee 
with a plot of land faces considerable challenges as it 
often does not fulfil the promise of self-reliance 
(which is the declared aim of this approach in con-
trast to the encampment policies of neighbouring 
countries such as Kenya and Tanzania). The insuffi-
cient plot size, poor quality of the soil and water 
shortage impede the self-sufficiency of many refu-
gees. Often, this forces refugees to borrow or beg for 
food or sell non-food items to supplement the poor 
harvest and/or monthly food rations. Moreover, we 
still find a very high dependence on water trucking, 
and the strain on natural resources such as water and 
firewood has a considerable environmental impact. 
Sustainable forest management, water pipelines and 
energy sufficient stoves have been introduced very 
slowly. 
Many refugees cannot benefit from their right to 
employment or free movement because the refugee set-
tlements hardly offer sustainable job opportunities, 
and infrastructure that would connect them with 
markets is poor. Even if refugees achieve to establish 
a small business, buyers and markets are insufficient 
to attain self-reliance. Thus, most refugees remain 
reliant on food rations which lately have also been 
reduced.
The sustainability of the settlement approach is 
further challenged by the fact that increasingly the 
communities’ consent to the allocation of land for 
refugee settlements cannot be taken for granted. The 
settlement approach is based on the assumption of 
the government that local communities consent, and 
Ugandan communities so far have overwhelmingly 
agreed to the set-up of refugee settlements. This has 
largely been ascribed to Ugandan communities’ em-
pathy with the refugees due to cultural commonali-
ties and a shared experience of displacement. 
Conclusion
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The Ugandan case provides several lessons for 
policymakers and aid organisations working in other 
refugee-receiving contexts: 
The case study shows that merely establishing 
the rights to employment, free movement and a plot 
of land for refugees does not suffice to guarantee the 
self-reliance or local integration of refugees. Instead, 
governments and aid organisations must make sure 
that refugees can also benefit from their rights by 
providing the necessary infrastructure so that they 
can move freely and access markets. 
If providing land to refugees, the government has 
to ensure that the land is large enough for growing 
sufficient quantities of crops, is located near their  
residence, the soil is adequate for cultivating, and that 
sufficient water is available. Furthermore, land rights 
need to be clearly defined to inhibit tensions. Not all 
refugees are farmers; this must be recognised, and  
alternative employment opportunities ought to be 
provided so that previously acquired skills are 
maintained and alternative incomes are assured, for 
example, in times of drought. Generally, long-term 
approaches, such as creating sustainable job opportu-
nities, are necessary that also include old arrivals of 
refugees, such as those in the south.
Refugees and local communities should be ad-
dressed in the same manner by aid agencies and the 
Ugandan government to prevent competition and 
conflict. Locals are often no better off than refugees. 
In that regard, it is also important to bear in mind 
the political context in which humanitarian and  
development aid enter and the risk that aid agencies 
support existing exclusion mechanisms. For example, 
the Ugandan government has traditionally neglected 
the north of the country. By stepping in for the gov-
ernment in the north, aid agencies may help refugees 
and receiving communities in the short-term. But 
without establishing long-term structures in the 
north that also stay after aid agencies leave, the eco-
nomic and political marginalization of the region 
will persist. Therefore, while Uganda's refugee policy 
has progressed, providing refugees more opportuni-
ties than in other refugee-receiving contexts such as 
in Kenya or Tanzania, it is a long way before it can be 
named a role model for refugee integration.
integration. Although mixed settlements exist and 
refugees and locals interact, social relations between 
them often remain minimal and superficial. Generally, 
the acceptance level is higher where locals benefit  
directly from the refugee presence and have shared 
displacement experience or ethnic kinship. 
A significant part of the South Sudanese refugees 
has no perspective of sustainable livelihood options 
in Uganda and, therefore, does not see a future with-
in the Ugandan settlements. For many refugees, sus-
tainable livelihoods—not to speak of local integra-
tion—in Uganda are completely out of sight. Some 
South Sudanese refugees have already returned, and 
others are deciding to return to South Sudan due to 
cut rations and despite the uncertain future of the 
current peace agreement and ongoing fighting in the 
country..
However, large numbers of the refugees in Uganda 
will have no choice but to stay in the country because 
of poor livelihood prospects in their countries of origin 
and the cycles of conflict and displacement South 
Sudanese and Congolese refugees have experienced. 
Also, the return of many Burundians is unlikely as 
many of them stated that they are no longer accepted 
as Burundians in their home country because they 
have been away for so long. This shows that it becomes 
even more necessary to facilitate the integration of 
all refugee groups in Uganda. 
The findings of the Paper clearly illustrate that 
Uganda’s self-reliance strategy as well as the CRRF 
were not designed to achieve a full socio-economic 
integration of refugees or—even less to allow them to 
become Ugandan citizens—but rather are based on 
the idea of a temporary local integration of refugees 
until their eventual return. In the case of Uganda, 
most refugees have so far not achieved the goal of lo-
cal integration, i.e. the ability to sustain a living and 
being socially integrated into the local Ugandan com-
munity. The Paper thus sharply contradicts the prem-
ise of any self-reliance policy that self-reliance would 
be possible without full socio- economic integration, 
but shows instead that self-reliance can hardly be 
achieved without a certain degree of socio-economic 
integration. The CRRF pilot country Uganda thus lags 
behind the expectations that were raised with regard 
to finding durable solutions for the refugees in the 
countries. 
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